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A Roundtable Discussion on 
Ryan M. Irwin's 
Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking 
of the Liberal World Order 
James H. Meriwether, Eric J. Morgan, Philip Muehlenbeck, Leslie Hadfield, Kate Burlingham, 
and Ryan M. Irwin 
Introduction 
fames H. Meriwether 
The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this ~rowth of national consciousness is a political fact,' declared British 
prime minister Harold Macmillan before South Africa's 
Parliament on an early February morning in 1960. "We must 
all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take 
account of it." Macmillan, speaking to the decolonization 
sweeping through Africa in this oft-quoted passage, 
counseled his listeners that all "must come to terms" with 
this reality. 
As he continued talking that day, Macmillan framed 
the "wind of change" in the broader Cold War context of 
the "struggle for the minds of men." Bringing together, 
as did many at the time, two of the great forces of the 
mid-twentieth century, he voiced his belief that nothing 
less than "our way of life" was at stake. His listeners 
undoubtedly agreed with that sentiment. The ensuing 
response by the South African government to those seeking 
change, however, most assuredly was not what Macmillan 
had in mind when he sat back down that morning. Just 
weeks later sixty-nine South African protestors lay dead 
at Sharpeville, the African National Congress and Pan-
Africanist Congress were banned, and black South African 
leaders such as Nelson Mandela were on the run. 
Over the next decade the situation in South Africa 
became a matter of international attention-from the 
capitals of newly independent African states, to the 
corridors of power in Washington D.C., to the halls of the 
United Nations. This international story plays out in new 
and interesting ways on the pages of Ryan Irwin's book, 
Gordian Knot. lrwin makes a case for Africa-and in this 
instance the international interaction with apartheid South 
Africa-being important to understanding the evolution 
of post-Worfd War II international institutions and 
unfolding world history. The Cold War, colonialism and 
decolonization, and issues of race were central to the global 
system in this era, and all these merged in Africa. 
Historians and other scholars are devoting more 
attention to just how these and other forces came together 
and what that conjunction of forces meant. The roundtable 
that follows is another step in the historical consideration of 
the African continent, and it shows how such interest orens 
more avenues for our understanding of the world o the 
twentieth century. In the pages of these thoughtful reviews, 
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one sees what a few years ago might have been hard to pull 
together: a wealth of talented scholars wrestling with the 
United States and Africa in an international context. They 
agree that there is much to be gained by reading Irwin's 
work even as they do not all agree on his interpretations. 
Those differences are themselves a reminder of how much 
there still is waiting to be explored. 
A Lost Struggle, a Lost World 
Eric f. Morgan 
As I am finalizing this roundtable review of Ryan Irwin's outstanding and groundbreaking debut book, Gordian Knot, I am also preparing to depart 
for South Africa, where I will be leading a travel course of 
fifteen students to Cape Town for sixteen days. My proposal 
for this course was so popular that, unfortunate1y, I had 
to turn away many students. I was surprised-but also 
delighted-with the positive response to South Africa as a 
potential destination of interest, particularly given several 
other attractive options. Yet my courses on the history of 
South Africa routinely garner waitlists. For some reason 
South Africa has always nad a strong appeal for my students 
here in the snowy Packerland of nortneastern Wisconsin. 
They are fascinated by it even now, nearly twenty years after 
Nelson Mandela's inauguration as the nation's first black 
president in 1994. Ryan Irwin is right that South Africa was 
and still is an enigma: its complicated past and refusal to 
submit to international norms fascinates us, and its history 
is so strikingly similar to that of the United States that we 
cannot help but be drawn to it. 
Gordian Knot adeptly situates South Africa and the 
complex issue of apartheid within the larger global 
development of decolonization in the 1960s and offers 
readers two major arguments about the era. First, Irwin 
postulates that the postwar independence of various 
African states was one of the most significant "ruptures" 
of the twentieth century. What did nation, progress, 
development, and even race mean in this new epoch 
following the breakdown of the old order of the world? 
Second, he argues that the United States' Cold War foreign 
policy of containment changed rapidly during the 1960s, 
and by the end of the decade, the nation-which had 
once been a champion of decolonization-was now an 
empire despised by much of the newly decolonized world. 
Apartheid was not the paramount issue of the 1960s, yet 
it created a divisive arena that brought a variety of actors 
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from nations and governments large and small from across 
the globe into a debate over what the world should look 
like. 
To illustrate his two major contentions, Irwin moves 
chronologically through several intriguing case studies 
that provide insights into the changing world of the 
1960s and the place of South Africa and apartheid in that 
dynamic global landscape. His initial chapter explores 
South Africa's development as a "citadel of whiteness" and 
describes the rise of black African nationalism, articulated 
by colorful leaders such as Anton Lembede and Robert 
Sobukwe, which challenged the status quo of white rule. 
The Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, in which sixty-nine black 
protesters were shot and killed by police following a mass 
reaching ramifications for the principle of self-government 
and eventually lead to the end goal of majority rule in 
South Africa. 
In a close ruling, the ICJ decided that it had no legal 
right to make a decision. That finding "shattered the idea 
that the Court would act as an agent of transitional justice" 
(123). Humanitarian interests were extralegal in this case, 
the court ruled. The ICJ judges rationalized that the battle 
should proceed in the political rather than the legal arena. 
In Irwin's eyes, the ICJ decision was a watershed 
moment. The ICJ had been the ultimate legal arbiter of the 
values of the world community and thus represented the 
ideal of the liberal world order. As he notes, "the outcome 
of the ICJ case reflected and reinforced" the trends of the 
1960s and "became a powerful symbol, civil disobedience campaign against the 
nation's restrictive pass laws, changed 
South Africa's trajectory and brought the 
nation and apartheid into international 
consciousness. 
The following chapter develops 
the competing ideologies of African 
nationalists and the ruling National Party, 
as each side attempted to define the debate 
over apartheid in its own terms after 
Sharpeville. A chapter on U.S. foreign 
policy, concentrating on the thougnts 
and actions of G. Mennen Williams, the 
assistant secretary of state for African 
Affairs, moves the story to the United States. 
The book's final section examines the 1966 
What emerges from Irwin's 
text is a gripping story. 
The various international 
institutions created at the 
end of the Second World 
War-most specifically the 
UN and its principal judicial 
body-materialize in Irwin's 
narrative as the critical arena 
for the confrontation of 
apartheid, even though they 
were ultimately ineffective. 
dramatizing the limitations of change in 
the decolonized world and foreshadowing 
future directions in the struggle against 
apartheid in southern Africa" (105). 
As a result of the ICJ's decision, Irwin 
argues, the African Group's strategy 
fractured. The United States subsequently 
moved closer to the South African 
government as a supporter of apartheid 
in its foreign policy, particularly during 
the Nixon administration. For Irwin, the 
failure of the United Nations and its court 
to confront apartheid successfully signaled 
the end of Woodrow Wilson's vision of 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) case 
involving South Africa's occupation of South West Africa 
(modern Namibia) and then explores the United Nations' 
African Group and the South African government's efforts 
to capitalize on the various developments of the 1960s. 
What emerges from Irwin's text is a gripping story. 
The various international institutions created at the end of 
the Second World War-most specifically the UN and its 
principal judicial body-materialize in Irwin's narrative 
as the critical arena for the confrontation of apartheid, 
even though they were ultimately ineffective. As the 
leaders of the South African liberation movements were 
sent to prison or forced into exile in the early 1960s, the 
focus of the antiapartheid campaign moved from internal 
struggle to external sanctions (apart from the misguided 
and remarkably unsuccessful attempts at armed struggle 
through Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo). The United Front, 
formed in London in 1960 as a collaboration between 
various liberation organizations in both South Africa and 
the occupied South West Africa, pushed for sanctions at the 
international level. The African Group, a collective of African 
states within the UN itself, took up the mantle of sanctions 
and won a critical victory when a formal declaration 
denouncing apartheid passed the General Assembly in 
1962. The following year, the Security Council passed a 
similar declaration-supported by U.S. Ambassador Adlai 
Stevenson in the strongest condemnation yet by a Western 
power-that included an arms embargo against South 
Africa, but not the stiff economic sanctions that the African 
Group had wished for. A victory to be certain, although, as 
Irwin sees it, a Pyrrhic one. 
At the heart of Irwin's story is the ICJ case on the 
South West Africa Mandate. The African Group's litigation 
azainst South Africa was an attempt to undo the Mandate 
that entrusted South West Africa to South Africa as part of 
the peace process following the end of the First World War. 
As Irwin notes, however, this territory was a Mandate of 
the League of Nations and not the UN. The South African 
government rationalized that it was therefore no longer 
a territory of the international community. The African 
Group sought to prove that South Africa's occupation 
was illegitimate. A decision in their favor would have far-
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liberal internationalism. The African 
National Congress solidified its position 
by the end of the 1960s as the legitimate organization of the 
liberation struggle (while in exile and largely removed from 
the South African people). The National Party achieved a 
monolithic status of its own and continued to consolidate 
its rule with scant internal opposition. The nation-state, the 
bane of the world and the cause of tumultuous conflict and 
suffering for most of the twentieth century, still reigned 
supreme in the international order. Colonialism remained 
alive and well after the rousing victories of African peoples 
in the 1950s and early 1960s over their oppressors. The 
world, Irwin concludes, turned postmodern, and today we 
are still dealing with the consequences of the fragmenting 
of the liberal world order. 
Gordian Knot has few flaws. It draws on impressive and 
exhaustive research from archives across three continents, 
including the little-used papers of the African National 
Congress. The writing is generally crisp and the stories 
compelling, though occasionally the author employs too 
much jargon. I also wish that Irwin had spent slightly 
more time in his initial chapters developing his thoughts 
on what the liberal international order actually was meant 
to be in the context of the postcolonial era. Additionally, 
if the ICJ had ruled against South Africa's occupation of 
South West Africa (a single vote would have changed the 
ruling), would the decision have then reflected the triumph 
of liberal internationalism? Consequently, would apartheid 
have ended any sooner than it did? Would Nelson Mandela 
and other political prisoners have been released from 
Robben Island, and would a multiracial democracy have 
been established at the end of the 1960s? 
Irwin also slightly underemphasizes the role of citizen 
activists in the 1960s. He argues that it was not until the 
1980s that the global antiapartheid movement truly 
coalesced and began to have an influence on policymakers, 
corporations, and other powerful entities tnroughout the 
world. Perhaps the antiapartheid struggle beyond the 
confines of tne UN actually legitimated the liberal world 
order, as the people themselves-in the United States, 
Great Britain, Sweden, New Zealand, and scores of nations 
across the world-made the confrontation of apartheid a 
priority for the world community outside of traditional 
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structures of governance, even when the UN and various 
governments would not do so. 
Ultimately, Gordian Knot is an exemplary model of what 
innovative thinking, writing, and research can produce. It 
is an erudite and important international history that melds 
intellectual history, diplomacy, and a vast global tapestry 
of ideas, personalities, and struggle, weaving together a 
compelling story that situates both South Africa and the 
United States in the postcolonial world of the 1960s. That 
world offered much potential and promise at the decade's 
outset but fell far short of fulfilling the hopes of those 
who wanted a global order based on equality and self-
determination for all peoples. 
Review of Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and 
the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order 
Philip E. Muehlenbeck 
The late 1950s/early 1960s were an important time in world history. A wave of African incfependence saw twenty-four newly independent states admitted into 
the United Nations between 1960 and 1963. By 1964, the 
number of nation states in that international body had more 
than doubled, and the percentage of member states from 
Africa and Asia had increased from roughly 24 percent 
to 52 percent. These changing demographics shifted the 
agenda of the UN toward the issues that 
War. By the late 1960s, however, the combination of a 
number of factors-preoccufation with the Vietnam War; 
the weakening of the civi rights coalition within the 
United States; a growing realization that the Cold War 
would not be won or lost in sub-Saharan Africa; and a 
Nixon administration less sensitive to the immoral nature 
of racial discrimination-shifted U.S. policy. Not only did 
the United States begin to support the legitimacy of South 
African apartheid, it embarked on the "containment of 
Third World political campaigns" (8). 
The government of South Africa began to feel vulnerable 
at this time not only because of the upswing in the political 
influence of African nationalism, but also because of 
changes in the views of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, all of which began to assert 
more pressure on Pretoria to abandon its apartheid policies. 
Irwin should be commended for writing the most nuanced 
account of this shift in history. South Africa adjusted to the 
changing environment by spending significant time and 
money on lobbying and public relations efforts designed to 
portray itself as steadfastly loyal to the West, fiercely anti-
communist, and a citadel of capitalism-while painting the 
nationalists of sub-Saharan Africa as unpredictable, with 
loyalties for sale to the highest bidder in the Cold War, and 
as politically and economically unstable. 
After detailing the changes in U.S. politics that impacted 
American policies toward apartheid, Irwin roints to the 
1966 International Court o Justice (ICJ) 
African and Asian states cared most about: 
decolonization and racism. Ryan Irwin's 
Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of 
the Liberal World Order is a masterful study 
of how policymakers in the United States, 
South Africa, and newly independent sub-
Saharan Africa responded to this new 
environment in the international system. 
Irwin rightly pinpoints the early 1960s 
as the high point of African nationalist 
power. In the late 1950s and early 1960s 
African states were not inconsequential 
players on the world stage. Riding high 
on the winds of change that swept away 
colonialism from the continent (aside 
In the late 1950s and early 
1960s African states were not 
inconsequential players on 
the world stage. Riding high 
on the winds of change tnat 
swept away colonialism from 
the continent (aside from the 
notable exceptions in southern 
Africa), African leaders had 
more political power in the 
early 1960s than at any other 
point in modern history. 
case against South Africa's occupation of 
South West Africa (modern day Namibia) 
as a turning point in the African Group's 
fight against South African apartheid. He 
notes that South African officials feared 
that a ruling against them in the ICJ 
would lead to severe sanctions or even 
an armed invasion by the international 
community, perhaps to evict them from 
South West Africa or to try to overturn 
the apartheid system within their own 
borders. (In fact, some of them had 
feared such an invasion at least since the 
Bay of Pigs.1) However, the ICJ ruled in 
from the notable exceptions in southern 
Africa), African leaders had more political 
power in the early 1960s than at any other point in modern 
history. Irwin refers to African independence as "one of 
the twentieth century's seminal ruptures" that augured 
in an era in which the newly independent African states, 
working together through a united African Group at the 
UN, challenged previously established views about the 
"nature of territoriality, race, and economic progress" (9). 
Opposition to apartheid in South Africa became the focus 
of the African Group's efforts at the UN and the "center of a 
larger conversation about the Cold War and decolonization 
in the postcolonial decade" (40). 
In response to such initiatives from the African Group, 
U.S. policymakers faced a difficult juggling act to figure out 
how to manage decolonization and respond to international 
racism as embodied by apartheid without jeopardizing 
their country's economic and military interests in the 
Cold War. Washington, in a sense, became trapped in the 
middle and was forced to serve as a referee between the 
African Group and the South African government within 
the UN. According to Irwin, the United States responded 
to this dilemma in two distinct phases. From 1960 to 1965 
Washington sided more heavily with the African Group 
in confronting South African apartheid. In doing so U.S. 
officials were responding to the American civil rights 
movement, but they were also trying to draw the newly 
independent African states to the West's side in the Cold 
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Pretoria's favor, and the African Group 
was forced to shift its strategy from 
pursuing economic sanctions in the 
United Nations and legal action through the ICJ against 
apartheid to a more broadly based propaganda effort 
for global human rights. Here Irwin makes a persuasive 
argument that this change altered the antiapartheid 
movement; it shifted from being rooted in opposition to 
racial discrimination and the sovereignty of states in the 
postcolonial system to being focused more on the universal 
human rights of the individual. 
Gordian Knot is a well-written and well-organized 
book built on the foundation of an impressive collection 
of archival research spanning three continents (Irwin uses 
the underutilized records of the United Nations and a wide 
array of South African sources to best effect). Each theme 
of the book is vividly framed with effective short vignettes 
at the beginning of every chapter. Irwin's scholarship 
is an intellectual tour de force that forces historians to 
contemplate new methodological and analytical questions. 
Yet Irwin's arguments often outrun his evidence, 
leading to exaggerated claims throughout the book. For 
example, early on he contends that "the fight against 
apartheid gave form to the political project known as the 
Third World" (5). But the formation of the third world 
owed more to opposition to the Cold War and European 
colonialism than opposition to apartheid, and the third 
world would have been little different had apartheid never 
existed. 
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Secondly, Irwin overstates how important an issue 
South African apartheid was for African states. While first-
generation African leaders certainly opposed apartheid, it 
was not likely the issue they cared about most, as Irwin 
implies. A review of memoranda of conversations between 
U.S. and African officials in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
would show that African leaders sought to discuss the 
situations in the Congo, Angola, and Algeria with their 
American counterparts more often than they did South 
African apartheid. The issue that the majority of them 
were most concerned about was the economic development 
of their own nations. (Tanzania's Julius Nyerere was a 
notable exception; for him, self-determination in southern 
Africa seemed more important than economic aid for his 
own state.) A litmus test for determining how important 
the issue of apartheid was for African nationalists is the 
side they took in the Cold War; few joined the Soviet camp 
despite Soviet opposition to, and U.S. tacit support for, 
apartheid South Africa. 
Irwin also tends to give too much credit for U.S. African 
policy to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. 
Mennen Williams. As I have argued elsewhere, African 
policy in the Kennedy administration, without a doubt, 
originated in the White House. 2 In countless oral history 
interviews American officials attribute the change in U.S. 
policy towards Africa to the president himself. Kennedy 
called country desk officers at the State Department to ask 
specific questions about minute details on issues affecting 
African nations. He asked his staff to compile reports on 
Africa for him and then he personally reviewed them. 
He circumvented the State Department and had direct 
correspondence with a number of his ambassadors to 
Africa. No other U.S. president has had as much personal 
involvement in African affairs. Kennedy not only met with 
more African heads of state than any other U.S. president, 
he also, I am sure, met with more ambassadors from African 
countries than any other occupant of the White House. 
Moreover, let us not forget that Kennedy took an 
interest in Africa and became a public supporter of African 
nationalism before virtually any other U.S. politician, 
as is evidenced by his speech on Algeria in 1957. He also 
became the chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations 
African Subcommittee, through which he met with 
numerous African politicians even before ascending to 
the presidency.3 Williams was only in a position to make 
changes to U.S. African policy because Kennedy selected 
him for the assistant secretary position and empowered 
him to do so (tellingly, JFK appointed Williams to that 
position even before naming a secretary: of state). Finally, 
Kennedy fully supported Williams after his "Africa for the 
Africans" comments (which Irwin does not discuss), when 
there was significant pressure (particularly from South 
Africans and Rhodesians) on him to replace Williams at the 
State Department. Williams obviously played an important 
role in setting the U.S. position on apartheid in the early 
1960s, but he was not as much of a maverick or an originator 
of policy as Irwin's account would suggest. 
Irwin's central thesis-that African independence and 
the African Group's fight against apartheid challenged 
U.S. power and controi over international organizations 
like the United Nations, the World Bank, and the IMF 
more than any other variable and "not only laid the seeds 
of detente" but also "marked the unmaking of America's 
liberal world order"-is a far-reaching and not fully 
persuasive claim (12). It seems to this reviewer that other 
factors such as globalization, the Sino-Soviet split, U.S. 
economic stagnation, and the rise of emerging powers like 
China, India, Brazil, and Japan were likely more important. 
Nonetheless, Gordian Knot is an impressive scholarly 
achievement in international history and deserves a wide 
audience. 
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Notes: 
1. See Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Betting on the Africans: John F. Ken-
nedy's Courting of African Nationalist Leaders (New York, 2012), 185. 
2. H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Philip E. Muehlenbeck, Betting 
on the Africans: John F. Kennedy's Courting of African Nationalist 
Leaders. Volume XIV, No. 3 (October 1, 2012). 
3. For more on Kennedy's policies towards Africa see Muehlen-
beck, Betting on the Africans. 
African States and the Complexities of International 
Anti-apartheid Movements 
Leslie Hadfield 
I n Gordian Knot, Ryan M. Irwin opens an important window into the international politics of the 1960s and casts new light on the way tne apartheid state and 
anti-apartheid forces fit into the international arena. The 
decade was a crucial period in African and South African 
history. Decolonization swept across much of the continent, 
and after the Sharpeville massacre South Africa entered 
a new era. The state cracked down on opposition, beefed 
up its security establishment, and turned increasingly to 
extra-legal means to quell resistance, forcing liberation 
movements underground and into exile. The African 
National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) both established armed organizations. South 
Africans and the international community were forced to 
choose sides. 
Irwin provides us with a much-needed examination of 
the international side of the story that gives us a sense for the 
complex, non-linear history of apartheid and anti-apartheid 
movements. His in-depth analysis of the decisions and 
directions different actors took at different times in the 1960s 
helps explain some of the paradoxical shifts of the decade. 
He also demonstrates how international and domestic 
politics in South Africa and the United States converged 
at a critical juncture, while at the same time extending his 
analysis beyond just the engagement of the United States 
and the West. Yet, while ne admirably brings out the 
important role of African forces in international politics, 
his portrayal of African nations and events raises further 
questions about the influence of African politics and actors. 
Irwin's focus on different moments in the 1960s is a 
testament to the value of taking a snapshot in time. Not 
only does he paint vivid pictures of particular incidents 
(e.g., the assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd or G. Mennen 
Williams getting hit in the jaw in Lusaka), he also examines 
the debates, events, and maneuvers that exrlain political 
shifts of the decade, when the outcome o the struggle 
against apartheid was unclear. As Irwin writes, this in-
depth analysis shows that South Africa's road to liberation 
was not inevitable, but "a political contest that ebbed and 
flowed in various directions as different doors opened and 
closed on international and domestic stages" (186). 
Irwin considers two of these shifts tnat are particularly 
valuable to understanding paradoxical international 
politics of the 1960s. First is the change in American policy 
towards South Africa from confrontation to "constructive 
reinvolvement" or support. His detailing of the work 
of people committed to ending racism abroad through 
international liberalism in the early 1960s shows that the 
possibility of concrete U.S. opposition did emerge in an 
otherwise long narrative of U.S. government support for 
the apartheid state. He also explains how the pendulum 
swung in the opposite direction for economic and domestic 
political reasons, despite the U.S. civil rights movement. 
Second, Irwin examines the way African nations moved from 
championing the anti-apartheid cause in the UN to offering 
merely support to South African liberation movements. 
At the same time, the South African government began 
"looking outward" to build relationships with neighboring 
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states. Looking at these two developments side by side helps 
us understand why leaders of indeRendent African nations 
would talk and work with the apartheid government in the 
late 1960s. 
The greatest contribution Irwin makes, however, is 
the way he links the apartheid debate to African politics 
in the post-colonial international arena. His analysis of 
the role the so-called third world played in antiapartheid 
movements fills a gap in the history of apartheid and anti-
apartheid movements. At the core of his argument is the 
observation that newly independent African nations used 
their sheer numbers to wield enough influence in the UN 
to bring the apartheid issue to the fore. Working largely 
through the UN African Group in the early 1960s, they 
were able to push members of the Security Council to 
debate apartheid and take a stand on related issues. Irwin 
adeptly shows how members of the African Group defined 
decolonization as resulting in racial equality, territorial 
autonomy, and economic development. They expected the 
UN to act in support of their vision, and their campaign 
prompted UN members to reconsider the 
debate about apartheid-the United States or the African 
Group? 
I came to the conclusion that Irwin was not contradicting 
himself, but that the answer is both shaped global politics in 
different ways. And the rest of Irwin's book demonstrates 
how it was a series of actions and reactions on the part of a 
number of players that determined the terms of debate and 
the political possibilities. Yes, African decolonization and 
African initiatives in the UN changed the intellectual terrain 
and Rushed others to address apartheid, but superpowers 
like the United States had the political power (e.g., seats 
on the Security Council) and economic interests to direct 
outcomes. Perhaps a cleaner chronology and organization 
of the chapters and narratives of the first part of the book 
would have cleared up this seeming contradiction. Irwin 
could also have addressed this tension more explicitly. 
Irwin could also have given blackAfricans more of a face. 
Except for a few familiar names (such as Kwame Nkrumah, 
Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, and the ANC's Oliver Tambo), 
most Africans appear as vague characters. We get only brief 
appearances by heads of states and an 
organization's purposes and reposition 
themselves witnin it. 
Because Irwin gives African actors at 
the UN due attention, he helps establish a 
well-rounded view of international anti-
apartheid activities and politics. African 
interactions with the South African 
state and anti-apartheid movements 
are an important element of the history 
of South African liberation and merit 
in-depth exRloration. The interests of 
activists, archivists, and writers have 
resulted in a skewed focus on the 
African interactions with the 
South African state and anti-
apartheid movements are an 
important element of the history 
of South African liberation and 
merit in-depth exploration. 
The interests of activists, 
archivists, and writers have 
resulted in a skewed focus on 
the antiapartheid activities of 
American and British activists. 
unnamed Nigerian ambassador (58). By 
contrast, Irwin examines American and 
South African diplomats quite closely. He 
does offer insigntful analysis of African 
continental politics, especially in relation 
to the International Court of Justice 
case over South West Africa, the Kitwe 
conference, and the way that liberation 
movements interacted with new African 
states throughout the 1960s. However, 
questions about the influence of domestic 
African national politics and the relations 
antiapartheid activities of American 
and British activists. For example, the 
seven-part documentary Have You 
Heard from Johannesburg (2006) devotes one entire erisode 
to American activists while attempting to cover al other 
movements around the world with the rest. The South 
African Democracy and Education Trust (SADET) Road to 
Democracy series offers a more balanced view in its third 
volume focused on international solidarity.1 SADET's fifth 
volume will focus on African solidarity, but it has yet to be 
published. Gordian Knot thus provides an important analysis 
of the crucial role of African states and actors. Moreover, 
Irwin's approach links South Africa to what was happening 
on the rest of the continent and thus balances South Africa's 
exceptionalism with its connections to continental Africa. 
That said, I struggled with the tension in the book 
between acknowledging the influence of African nations 
in shaping the international debate over apartheid and its 
trajectory on the one hand, and holding up the United States 
as the major player on the international scene on the other. 
The emphasis on the significance of African decolonization 
and African groups in the UN for international politics 
in the introduction led me to expect more of an African 
focus throughout the book. Irwin does provide this focus 
in some of his critical chapters, such as chapter 2, where 
he demonstrates how African nationalists and Afrikaner 
nationalists defined the debate in the UN from 1960 to 1964. 
Yet he follows that chapter with one (titled "Africa for the 
Africans") focused entirely on G. Mennen Williams and 
U.S. foreign policy towards apartheid in the UN. These two 
chapters put forth seemingly contradictory arguments. In 
chapter 2, it is African and Afrikaner nationalists defining 
the debate and reshaping international politics, while in 
chaRter 3, the United States is an "unquestioned hegemon 
by the early 1960s," shaping global politics and political 
possibilities. A similar contradiction is repeated in chapters 
4 and 5. The contradiction left me questioning what Irwin 
was really arguing. Who was shaping global politics and the 
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between African states remain. 
I do not fault Irwin too much for 
this shortcoming. The book includes the 
politics of numerous African countries. 
Conducting research for all of these actors in the same 
way would have been a monumental task. Furthermore, 
the kind of rich sources Irwin drew upon for the United 
States and South African side of the story may not exist in 
some of the other cases. Yet Irwin shows us how insightful 
a close examination of the role of particular people can be 
in the chapter featuring Williams. One wonders how much 
more could be revealed if the same sort of research and 
analysis could be done for other actors. I also wondered 
what impact other major Cold War developments on the 
continent had on both U.S. and African positions and 
relations. For example, considering the CIA's involvement 
in Patrice Lumumba's capture and death, how did Williams 
perceive the Congo crisis? Did it impact his actions or the 
dialogue at the UN? There is much work for others to do in 
investigating the questions that Gordian Knot raises. Perhaps 
the forthcoming SADET volume on African antiapartheid 
movement solidarity will answer some of them. Those who 
tackle these guestions should be alert to the problems of 
juxtaposing tne entire diverse continent of Africa with a few 
individual states. 
Irwin presents a more balanced portrayal of South 
African actors-both the apartheid state and liberation 
movements. Still, more attention to internal politics and 
developments could have strengthened his analysis. For 
example, his explanation of the ANC's shift to focusing 
on building solidarity with non-state international groups 
is incisive; but other factors could have been considered 
in explaining ANC changes in the 1960s, such as internal 
tensions over the turn to violence (see recent debates 
sparked by Scott Couper's book on Albert LuthulF) and the 
impact of state repression. South Africa also saw the growth 
of above-ground antiapartheid activity in the late 1960s 
that was linked to international movements beyond formal 
politics and the AN C. It would be useful to gauge the impact 
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that student networks and religious organizations like the 
World. Council of Churches (in which South Africans played 
an active role) had on the ANC and international politics. 
All. in all, ~owev.er, Gordian Kn~t accomplishes a great 
deal. It IS an enhghtenmg book that will spark fruitful debates 
and inspire research that will further our understanding of 
the apartheid state, antiapartheid movements, and the post-
colonial international world order. 
Notes: 
1. South African Democracy and Education Trust, The Road to De-
mocracy in South Africa, Volume 3: International Solidarity (Pretoria 
2008). I 
2. Scott Couper, Albert Luthuli: Bound by Faith (Durban, 2010). 
Review of Ryan Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the 
Unmaking of the Liberal World Order 
Kate Burlingham 
A frica's involvement in global politics during the Cold War is usually described as peripheral at best. . If Afric~n leaders are ~ncluded in Cold War history, 
then presence IS usually fleetmg and hardly essential to the 
narr~tive. O~e often has .to refer to mor~ topical monographs 
f~r mt~gration of Afncan leaders mto global political 
discussions and for thorough analysis of their motivations. 
With impressive style and analytical skill, Ryan Irwin 
has att~mpted to address this historiograrhical problem 
by ad~mg .a much-needed c~apter to the historiography 
?f Afn~a m the world. Usmg an . exhaustive array of 
mt~rnatlonal sources and approachmg the topic from a 
vanety of vantage points, Irwin's fascinating book, Gordian 
Knot, offers new insight into how African decolonization 
radically altered the global political climate and post-World 
War II international institutions. 
The 1960s was one of the most crucial twentieth-century 
decades for the African continent. Yet the way African and 
global leaders interacted with each other during the early 
1960s ?iffered radically from the way they engaged each 
other JUSt ten years later. Why? What occurred in such 
a short timespan? Gordian Knot demonstrates that this 
change was sfiaped by one battle in particular: the fight 
to end South African apartheid. Apartheid was African 
nationalists' "real-time foil"; it embraced "racial segregation 
and colonial-style paternalism" at the very moment when 
much of the world was moving away from colonialism (10, 
5). The b~ttle to end aparth~id united. third world leaders 
even as It ~hallenged then contention that modernity 
and economic advancement could not be achieved in a 
bifurcated racialist system. 
The battle against apartheid also offered third world 
leaders a way to define themselves outside the bipolarity 
of the Cold War. They used the United Nations and other 
pos.twar international institutions as platforms from 
which to wage the battle. These institutions were created 
after the Second World War out of a rejection of the 
racism and imrerialism that defined the era of European 
colonialism. When these same institutions failed to stop 
and even bolstered the South African government, third 
worl.d. leader.s had to rec.onsider the ways in which they 
partiCipated m global sooety. Through his narrative, Irwin 
demonstr~tes how the apartheid debate, often relegated 
to the penphery of Cold War studies, in fact exemplifies 
many of tne key debates of the day while foreshadowing 
important discussions of the post-Cold War era. 
Using South African apartheid as its focus, Gordian 
Knot asks an essential question: "How did the rapid growth 
of small, non-European nation-states at midcentury affect 
the international community" (5)? Irwin's answer forms 
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the two primary arguments of his book. On the one hand, 
he seeks to expose the centrality of African decolonization 
to the story of twentieth-century world history. Indeed, it 
is through decolonization, we are told, that contemporary 
actors discussed important issues related to "the nature 
of territoriality, race, and economic progress" (9). Irwin's 
sec<;mdary argul!len~ flows f~om the changes ushered in by 
Afncan decoiomzatwn. Agamst the backdrop of a rapidly 
evolving Africa, the United States strugg1ed to react. 
According to Irwin, these reactions concerned more than 
Africa; tney marked a moment in which "Washington's 
approach toward the rest of the world-its stance towards 
global governance-changed fundamentally" (11). As the 
authors of many of the postwar global institutions, United 
?tates o!ficials did not fully calculate how a change in 
mternatlonal order, ushered in by decolonization, might 
cha~lenge ~heir conception. of the global power structure. 
Irwm beheves that Afncan decolonization and the 
"?udden emergence of almost forty non-European states" 
simultaneously confirmed "America's post-imperial vision 
of the world" while offering "a direct threat to Washington's 
continued hegemony" (12). 
The United States, it turned out, could not control these 
new states. At a moment when American leaders were 
trying to ameliorate domestic race problems and fight a 
war for the allegiance of the world's decolonizing peoples, 
African leade~s put "guesti<?ns of race squa~ely at the center 
of world affairs ... lexrosmg] the preJUdiCes that quietly 
underpinned Americas liberal world order" (12). The 
importance of this challenge, Irwin tells us, extends beyond 
Washington and marks "the moment when small, non-
~urope~n states took ~orTal control of the agenda of the 
mternational commumty (12). That changeover, in turn, 
marked an important shift in the United States' interaction 
with these international organizations, which would no 
longer be the "bulwark of American global powers" (12). By 
the end of the 1960s, the United States had decided to back 
~way fr<?m the. UN, a~d that decision recast its once positive 
mternatwnal Image mto the world's "New Empire" (13). 
Global politics would never be the same. 
Irwin divides his text into two parts that revolve around 
a pivotal moment in the story, the 1966 International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) rul~ng regarding South A.fr!ca's occupation 
of. Southwest Afnca (present-day Namibia). At stake in 
this case was not only South Africa's right to remain in 
Sou.thwest Africa but also, according to Irwin, the faith of 
Afncan leaders in so-called "postcolonial organizations" 
such as the ICJ and the UN as well as their overall "faith 
in the nation-state as an instrument of development and 
freedom" (154). 
Part I explores the lead-up to the ICJ crisis in three 
expertly crafted chapters that cover the three venues in 
wnich the debate over apartheid played out: South Africa, 
the UN, and the United States. In the first chapter of this 
section, Irwin sets up the antagonisms that defined South 
African politics after the Second World War. As much of 
the world was moving away from colonialism and racial 
segregation, South Africa was moving towards it. We 
learn, however, that rather than being a monolithic idea, 
t~e. system of apartheid g~ew out of several competing 
VISions. The vmces opposmg the developing apartheid 
state were equally diverse. Yet, according to Irwin, what 
set Afrikaner and African nationalists apart was not only 
their views on race but, more important, now they saw the 
world around them. Afrikaner nationalists framed their 
worldview through domestic events. African nationalists, 
on .the other hand, "fo~used o!-1- the symmetry between 
their struggle and the fight agamst European exploitation 
elsewhere" (38). This difference between Afrikaner and 
African nationalists, Irwin explains, "foreshadowed the 
fault lines of the global apartheid debate of the subsequent 
decade" (39). 
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Irwin brings the story to the UN in chapter 2 by 
tracking the internationalization of the a2artheid debate 
following the Sharpeville massacre, in which sixty-nine 
protesters were gunned down by South African police. 
Of particular interest in this chapter is Irwin's discussion 
of fhe Afrikaner government's Shifting tactics in how it 
packaged apartheid for the world. For lrwin, such tactics 
reveal something more profound about the era: the "deep 
fissures [that] separate the First World politicians from the 
Third World ones" (44). The strength of Irwin's discussion 
in this chapter lies in his observation that what ultimately 
divided UN representatives in the debate over apartheid 
was the role tney believed the international body should 
have in the affairs of a sovereign state. Was the UN 
meant to complement national power or was it meant to 
be a "mechanism to reshape international norms"? The 
profundity of this question is reinforced by its continued 
relevance today. 
Irwin's third chapter brings the apartheid debate to 
South Africa's most strategically important ally, the United 
States. While acknowledging that the United States "did 
not have a direct stake in the apartheid debate," Irwin 
stresses that its international power did nonetheless shape 
"what was politically possible in these years" (73). Perhaps 
the most significant nistoriographical contribution of tnis 
chapter is Irwin's detailed analysis of the important role of 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen 
Williams in crafting U.S. relations with Africa. Williams, 
we learn, fundamentally "shaped how American global 
power interacted with postcolonial questions ... [providing] 
a consistent counterweight to those policymakers apathetic 
about Third World political demands" (75). 
Having outlined the major players involved, Irwin 
begins Part II of his book with tne ICJ case on which his 
entire story pivots. In his strongest chapter, he lays out 
the important questions that the ICJ and South African 
apartheid posed for the world, questions that would turn 
out to have enormous significance for the future. At stake 
for so-called third world nationalists was their belief in the 
idea "that history was moving in a linear fashion toward a 
political order based on territorial liberation, racial equality, 
and economic development"(117). The applicants filing the 
case against South Africa asked the court to look beyond 
Southwest Africa and rule on the much larger question of 
whether "there was a single moral system for the world." 
And if there was, "did the 'international community' truly 
have boundless supervisory powers over nation-states in 
the world-system" (117)? 
A ruling in favor of third world nationalists would have 
validated an "emerging 'postcolonial' vision of power based 
on universal racial equality" (118). Most observing nations, 
and the United States in particular, began to think about 
how they would react to what was seen as the inevitability 
of the ICJ ruling in favor of the nationalists' claim. It came 
as a great surprise to many when the court upheld South 
Africa's claim to Southwest Africa. The ruling "shattered 
the idea that the Court would act as an agent of transitional 
justice" and emboldened the South African government. 
The final two chapters of Irwin's text consider the 
fallout from the ICJ decision and how it reoriented the 
tactics and policies of all parties involved. Fundamental 
to these chapters is Irwin's commitment to demonstrating 
that the ultimate end of apartheid in the 1990s was neither 
inevitable nor predictable but "ebbed and flowed in 
various directions as different doors opened and closed on 
international and domestic stages" (186). The ICJ ruling was 
a setback for those fighting apartheid, but it forced them to 
reorient their battles in way that ultimately would prove 
more powerful. Keenly aware of its Cold War strategic 
importance and emboldened by the court ruling, the South 
African government was able to parlay its victory into 
more favorable relations with the United States. Prior to 
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the ruling, the U.S. government, influenced by the work of 
Mennen Williams, had been hedging its bets against the 
apartheid regime. Convinced that its days were numbered, 
both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations sought 
to assure third world leaders that the United States stood 
united against racist regimes. This stance was especially 
important within the context of the Cold War. With the 
ICJ's decision supporting the South African government, 
the United States did an about-face. As a result, "by the end 
of 1968, Washington had accepted the status quo in South 
Africa and was beginning to discuss ways to curtail the 
influence of anti-apartheid advocates at the international 
level" (128). 
For African nationalists, the ICJ ruling posed different 
problems. What in the early 1960s had been a belief in the 
transformative powers of the UN turned into a much more 
restrained assessment of the organization as a "knowledge 
source" and "organizing center" (143). Far from giving up 
their battles, however, anti-apartheid activists switched to 
fighting the South African government. In the aftermath 
of the ICJ decision, they transformed apartheid from a 
'"regional [African] problem' into a flashpoint in a larger, 
integrated story of neocolonial power in the world" that 
was "out of step with the shared values of all the people in 
the world community" (144, 146). Reframing apartheid in 
these terms galvanized people around the world into what 
became a global movement to end South African apartheid. 
According the Irwin, the success of this new tactic 
combined with the failures in the UN and ICJ to reinforce 
the idea that "true inde2endence" did not come "from 
decolonization but from the networks and identities that 
transcended, contested, and subverted the nation-state" 
(154). Irwin believes that such subverting demonstrated 
"the way globalization was transforming the Cold War" 
(155). 
The strong points of Irwin's text are also its greatest 
weaknesses. In seeking to remain true to the multifaceted 
and complex situation surrounding South African 
apartheid, Irwin weaves a narrative that is at times 
confusing. Taken individually, his chapters present strong 
arguments that are lessons in close reading and painstaking 
research. Yet when woven together, these same chapters at 
times feel disjointed because of the multitude of arguments 
they are trying to make. For example, Irwin's analysis 
of international organizations such as the UN and the 
International Court of Justice is seamless and fascinating. 
His ability to home in on the larger issues at stake is 
impressive. However, the pairing of this conversation with 
a detailed analysis of U.S. foreign policy feels mismatched; 
the nuts and bolts of policymaking are presented alongside 
more profound conclusions about how the ICJ decision 
altered global thinking. Despite these jarring moments of 
overreach, Ryan Irwin's text is a welcome addition to the 
global history of the post-World War II era and is a valuable 
source for use in botn undergraduate and graduate courses. 
A Different Lens 
Ryan M. Irwin 
A very sincere thank you to Kate Burlingham, Leslie Hadfield, Eric Morgan, and Phil Muehlenbeck, as well as James Meriwether for his introduction and 
Andrew Johns for this orportunity. In the past few years, I 
have had the privilege o working alongside Kate, Eric, and 
Phil at different conferences, and I have admired Leslie's 
work from afar. Together they are doing some of the most 
important and interesting scholarship in our field, and I am 
deeply appreciative of the thoroughness of their comments 
ancf the ilioughtfulness of their critiques. 
As each of the essays suggests, Gordian Knot is an 
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unusual book. It is not quite a history of U.S. foreign 
relations-African and Afrikaner nationalism organize too 
much of the narrative-but it is not really an African history 
either, since most of the action unfolds within international 
organizations. The book is designed to work on two levels; it 
explores both the diplomatic contest that surrounded South 
African apartheid and the intellectual story of how people 
learned lessons about their sovereignty as they exercised 
that sovereignty in novel ways after decolonization. Gordian 
Knot tries to capture what American hegemony felt like in 
these years, especially to small actors with big expectations. 
The book admittedly revels in its own granularity at times-
as Burlingham and Hadfield suggest-but this attention 
to detail is balanced by a hedgehog-like interpretation of 
international life in the 1960s. 
Gordian Knot is the product of our historiographical 
moment. When Matthew Connelly called on diplomatic 
historians to take off the "Cold War lens" and explore the 
twentieth century in its full 
apartheid's centrality both to the Third World project 
and to African nationalism-subtly distort my claims. 
Gordian Knot is about a microcosm, one that illuminated 
an ongoing debate about racial paternalism's relationship 
to material progress and the postcolonial nation-state. My 
argument is not that Africans chose to care about apartheid 
over development or Algeria or the Congo; it is that South 
Africa's poficies sharpened opinions about the meaning 
of development and racial difference. Muehlenbeck and 
I are engaged in different sorts of intellectual projects. 
On the Third World, for instance, the sentence he quotes 
comes at the end of a deliberately phrased paragraph that 
doesn't argue that anti-apartheid sentiment "formed" the 
Third World. Rather, it shows that apartheid influenced 
the wider discourse of anti-racism in these years, which 
played a crucial role in shaping the political agenda of the 
Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations. Muehlenbeck fails 
to relate the nuances of this claim, and his suggestion that 
apartheid had no influence on 
complexity, his words were a 
useful reminder-especially 
to graduate students searching 
for dissertation projects-that 
the East-West interpretative 
paradigm had certain 
conceptual limitations. That 
was thirteen years ago, and if 
you have attended a SHAFR 
conference recently you have 
probably had the privilege of 
listening to panels on topics 
ranging from migration and 
borders to cultural theory 
and transnational activism. 
the Third World is factually 
Gordian Knot attempts to move the United States to inaccurate. 
the side in a way that enhances our understanding Muehlenbeck raises 
of American power during the mid-twentieth some good points about 
century. Washington was a referee in the apartheid President Kennedy. Our 
debate-not an antagonist-and treating it as quarrel may have potential 
such facilitates a two-part investigation of how as an organizing debate in 
outside actors influenced U.S. policy and how U.S. this subfield: What motivated 
officials responded to their efforts. This approach America's interest in African 
requiresd·uxtapositions that some readers may find affairs? Muehlenbeck and I 
unortho ox, as Burlingham indicates, but it provides agree that the U.S. government 
useful insight into the way high politics interacted engaged African issues in 
with postcolonial claim-making. these years, but we disagree on 
the reasons. For Muehlenbeck 
this engagement stemmed 
The Cold War lens is off. This 
turn has carried many labels and has found widespread 
support within SHAFR, but it has also muddled the field 
in fascinating and frustrating ways, and Gordian Knot is 
designed to tacitly raise an underexplored question: What 
are we talking about? 
The book flirts with two different sorts of answers. First, 
it eschews the bilateral approach to international history. 
Gordian Knot attempts to move the United States to the side 
in a way that enhances our understanding of American 
power during the mid-twentieth century. Washington was 
a referee in the apartheid debate-not an antagonist-and 
treating it as such facilitates a two-part investigation of 
how outside actors influenced U.S. policy and now U.S. 
officials responded to their efforts. Tnis approach requires 
juxtapositions that some readers may find unorthodox, as 
Burlingham indicates, but it provides useful insight into 
the way high politics interacted with postcolonial claim-
making. 
Second, the book makes a case for studying political 
process. The growing tendency to theorize American 
power has culminated in a vibrant historiography that has 
obscured the contingencies of international life in the mid-
twentieth century. Focusing on what I call identification 
politics is one way to explain the development and 
foreclosure of different political trajectories in the recent 
past, and it sheds light on how tropes of empire operated 
within particular contact zones. Gordian Knot, in other 
words, invites a conversation about the way American 
power worked. It is not a call to study apartheid or global 
race relations so much as a subtle rejection of the field's 
obsession with American power's name. 
Burlingham, Hadfield, Morgan, and Muehlenbeck 
critique this approach in different and very smart ways. Phil 
Muehlenbeck expresses the most skepticism about Gordian 
Knot's conclusions. As his footnotes attest, he has a dog in this 
fight and some of these comments are as relevant to his book 
as mine. His first two criticisms-that I have exaggerated 
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from an unwritten /olicy 
that was designed by Kennedy himself and flowe from 
his egalitarian commitment to social justice and African 
people. I'm not convinced by his evidence. In chapter 3, 
Gordian Knot uses Mennen Williams's story to explore the 
mechanics of how civil rights and liberal internationalism 
interacted with U.S. policymaking toward South Africa. 
Rather than taking the president's words at face value, the 
resulting narrative lingers on the tension between rhetoric 
and politics and points the reader toward an alternative 
concfusion: the administration's African policy was tied 
to the United Nations. Kennedy lobbied African leaders 
and adopted a symbolic stand toward apartheid because 
he hoped that mid-century international institutions 
could manage the tumult of African decolonization and 
enhance American prestige in the postcolonial world. By 
using Williams's story as a device to explore Washington's 
messiness, this argument attempts to enhance what we 
have already learned from Thomas Noer, Tim Borstelmann, 
and William Minter. The president mattered, but so too 
did the assumptions that connected Washington to these 
institutions. 
Muehlenbeck also challenges the book's central claim. 
In his mind, the Sino-Soviet split, globalization, and 
American economic stagnation, among other variables, 
played a more prominent role than decolonization in 
eroding Washington's influence over and support for the 
United Nations order. There is a terrific group of young 
historians working on this question, including Paul 
Chamberlin, Chris Dietrich, Jeremy Friedman, Victor 
McFarland, Chris Miller, Mike Morgan, Daniel Sargent, 
and Sarah Snyder, and it would be exciting if this shift 
in the Washington-UN relationship gained traction in 
the historiography, since the United Nations' importance 
is often downplayed in narratives about the Cold War. 
I stand by my interpretation. Notions of nationhood and 
order changed as people interacted within international 
arenas, and the book's central irony-that this conflict 
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moved in tandem with Washington's fleeting embrace of 
interactive institutions such as the United Nations and the 
International Court-is a useful way to think about how 
and why the system became unmanageable when it did. 
The anti-apartheid story facilitates a detailed examination 
of decolonization's relationship to global governance and 
illuminates some of the stakes that surrounded the turn 
toward detente. There may be better ways to conceptualize 
this period-and I eagerly await the evolution of this 
historiography-but my argument isn't necessarily wrong 
just because it's new. 
Gordian Knot is about the unmaking of a political 
system, the origin and afterlife of which are beyond the 
book's temforai frame. The book looks the way it does for 
a reason, o course, but Eric Morgan is right to critique this 
underlying tension. He raises two interesting questions: 
Was there a lost moment in the 1960s, and did citizen 
activists buttress liberal internationalism? On both fronts, 
my tentative answer is no. Gordian Knot certainly invites 
the reader to see the ICJ case through African nationalist 
eyes, and it suggests that American policy thinking wasn't 
preordained in the mid-1960s, but I prefer to see this 
moment's implications in grayer terms. 
My hope is that readers will pay as much attention to the 
midpoint of the ICJ case, when the African Group's lawyers 
turned to the norm of nondiscrimination, as its controversial 
resolution. Although American liberals certainly remained 
internationally minded after the 1960s, a fascinating shift 
occurred as development and decolonization collided in 
these years and older assumptions about state capacity and 
universal modernity eroded in the face of racial equality, 
human rights, and non-national identity. I prefer to see 
the ICJ as a window into this process rather than a lost 
moment, which tacitly answers Morgan's question about 
citizen activism. His version of liberal internationalism-
focused on collaboration among citizen activists and 
advocacy against a common enemy-has merit, but it 
would arguably obscure this transition and distort the 
nation-state's conceptual centrality to the mid-twentieth 
century. Although liberals remained internationalist after 
1970, the assumptions that oriented the liberal order had 
fallen by the wayside. 
That is a topic worthy of a long debate. Less debatable 
is Leslie Hadfield's observation that African diplomats 
should have had a greater presence in Gordian Knot. One 
of the book's main research challenges was gaining access 
to African diplomatic materials. I used private papers 
and South Africa's liberation archive, as well as United 
Nations materials, but I was unable to secure access to 
diplomatic cables from African governments, which was 
a disappointment. The resulting portrait is as complex 
and tnorough as my sources allowed. Hadfield's lament 
regarding unnamed Africans is misguided, in my opinion, 
since Americans and South Africans are also left unnamed 
at different junctures, always for stylistic reasons related 
to narrative flow. But I accept the overall thrust of her 
critigue. One issue that continues to absorb me is the 
medi.anics of how African diplomats communicated with 
their home governments. From what I can tell, African 
diplomats enjoyed a unique sort of autonomy in New York, 
which hints at the somewhat ironic nature of postcolonial 
sovereignty after 1960. For small national states, the General 
Assembly became essential to the meaning (and location) 
of "independence." 
On the ANC, Hadfield's comments are useful. Although 
she skims over my actual interpretation, calling it incisive 
without explainins; its place in this literature, sne is correct 
that Gordian Knot s final chapter might have done more 
with events in black South Africa during the late 1960s. 
The ANC's archives don't indicate that the exile mission 
operated in the way she suggests-especially after the 
Rivonia Trials-but every book would benefit from more 
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attention to local nuance. 
Again, a very sincere thankJou to Kate Burlingham, 
Leslie Hadfield, Eric Morgan, an Phil Muehlenbeck. I am 
honored by their willingness to review the book and deeply 
appreciative of their thoughtful and incisive critiques. My 
hope has always been that Gordian Knot might contribute to 
the ongoing conversation about the contours, content, and 
direction of U.S. foreign relations history. 
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